El Fasher and Wider Sudan: OSINT Exhibits on Civilian Killings, Route Control and UN Targeting
This document collates ten OSINT exhibits from late 2025 related to El Fasher, Al‑Dabbah, South Kordofan and key trade routes in Sudan. It is structured for use by analysts and investigators: each item has a short description, key indicators, and a concise assessment linked to the wider “missing” population in El Fasher and patterns of RSF activity.
Context frame: El Fasher and the “missing”
At the time of the fall of El Fasher to RSF (late October 2025), estimates indicate approximately 250,000–260,000 civilians remained in the city.
Subsequent imagery and investigations show extensive killings, burned vehicles and bodies on escape routes, and multiple suspected mass graves, with roughly 150,000 civilians assessed as “missing” relative to pre‑fall population baselines.
The exhibits below—videos and imagery sourced via Russian, Arabic and Wagner‑linked correspondents, plus translated satellite products—support the assessment that a large fraction of the “missing” are dead, not unregistered IDPs.
Exhibits and analytical notes
Exhibit 1 – RSF hunting civilians after the siege of El Fasher
CONTENT: Video – RSF fighters “hunting” civilians post‑siege.
RSF fighters hunting civilians after the siege; surfaced via Wagner‑linked correspondents operating inside blackout zones; note on how cutting such channels blinds Western observers to atrocities.
Key indicators:
RSF uniforms/insignia, weapons and language consistent with Darfur RSF units.
Pursuit and firing behaviour directed at unarmed civilians in a post‑siege environment, not active urban combat.
Source networks (Wagner‑aligned correspondents) are known to operate in high‑risk information‑denied zones.
Assessment:
Strong visual support for systematic post‑siege hunting of civilians around El Fasher, aligning with mass‑killing accounts.
Demonstrates that blocking hostile or grey information channels can remove critical atrocity visibility, a relevant point for policy on platform moderation and sanctions.
Original X and Telegram Posts:
https://x.com/i/status/1997078946631110754
Exhibit 2 – Execution of elderly civilian in El Fasher
CONTENT: Censored video – RSF fighter executing an elderly man following the siege.
RSF fighter executes an elderly man after the siege; video from Arabic correspondents still in the area.
Key indicators:
Victim is elderly, unarmed, under RSF control at close range.
Execution appears deliberate and unprovoked, consistent with summary execution of detained civilians.
Local Arabic media actors are still gathering footage despite blackout, indicating persistent but fragile documentation channels.
Assessment:
Clear example of extrajudicial killing of a protected person by RSF, contributing to a pattern of deliberate civilian liquidation after El Fasher’s fall.
Supports the view that many detained or remaining civilians in the city were killed, feeding into the “missing” figure.
Confidence: high.
Original X and Telegram Posts:
https://x.com/i/status/1998539017424613820
Exhibit 3 – Executions of detained civilians linked to El Fasher’s “missing”
Censored video – RSF executing detained civilians; post explicitly ties to >100,000 “missing”.
“El Fasher’s ‘missing’ — over 100,000 people — are not missing”; censored execution video sourced via Russian correspondents.
Key indicators:
Detainees under RSF custody are executed at close range, likely outside active battle.
Temporal context: “late October” situates footage immediately after siege, when population loss occurs.
Russian correspondent sourcing indicates a separate, non‑Western information channel corroborating other footage.
Assessment:
Directly supports the analytic claim embedded in the post: a large portion of the “missing” were subject to summary executions as detainees rather than disappearing in untracked displacement.
Strengthens linkage between reported missing numbers and lethal RSF practices captured on camera.
Confidence: high.
Original X and Telegram Posts:
https://x.com/i/status/1998541643067306356
Exhibit 4 – RSF celebrating mass execution of fleeing civilians (video)
CONTENT: Video – RSF fighters celebrating after mass execution of fleeing civilians, post‑siege.
RSF fighter(s) celebrating mass execution of fleeing civilians after the siege; explicitly linked to satellite imagery and genocide fears; re‑upload after original deletion on X.
Key indicators:
Celebratory posture and rhetoric in an environment marked by large‑scale vehicle/burn damage.
Stated linkage to satellite imagery documenting mass burn patterns and possible grave sites.
Assessment:
Provides behavioural confirmation (celebration) that large‑scale killings of fleeing civilians were intentional and considered a success by RSF fighters.
Corroborates satellite‑level evidence with on‑the‑ground perpetrator footage, raising confidence that road‑corridor destruction is directly tied to executions, not purely cross‑fire.
Confidence: high.
Original X and Telegram Posts:
https://x.com/kianlayer0/status/1999670740187312564?s=20
Exhibit 5 – Mass execution of fleeing civilians and satellite corroboration (image/text)
CONTENT: Satalite image and text – burnt cars and ruins plus explanatory caption.
“The mass execution of fleeing civilians… Satellite imagery shows mass burnt cars… Video above from Russian sources shows RSF fighters celebrating amid the ruins. One of many.”
Key indicators:
Satellite imagery shows high‑density burned vehicles along escape routes, matching independent analyses.
“One of many” indicates multiple similar sites, consistent with multi‑axis kill‑zone pattern.
Assessment:
Integrates Russian‑sourced ground video with satellite geospatial evidence, presenting a coherent picture of repeated mass execution events against fleeing civilians.
Strongly supports modelling the “missing” as largely dead, distributed across several road and perimeter sites.
Confidence: high.
Original X and Telegram Posts:
https://x.com/i/status/1999665028631597056
Exhibit 6 – Translation of satellite imagery showing mass burnt cars
CONTENT: Image/text – translated satellite product (Arabic→English).
Translation of satellite imagery showing mass burnt cars of fleeing civilians killed by RSF fighters.
Key indicators:
Satellite product from Arabic source is translated, making non‑Western analysis accessible to broader audiences.
Imagery clearly displays vehicle clustering and burn patterns consistent with convoy destruction, not random fires.
Assessment:
Enhances cross‑lingual dissemination of key OSINT, reducing dependence on English‑language institutions for critical imagery.
Further corroborates that the “mass execution of fleeing civilians” is observable at satellite scale, not anecdotal.
Confidence: high.
Original X and Telegram Posts:
https://x.com/i/status/1999311002014491029
Exhibit 7 – RSF celebrating amid mass burnt cars (video)
CONTENT: Censored video – RSF celebrating near mass burnt cars, tied again to the El Fasher escape routes.
Censored footage of RSF celebrating the mass execution of fleeing civilians; explicitly “corroborates satellite imagery of mass burnt cars amid genocide fears.”
Key indicators:
RSF fighters present in immediate vicinity of mass‑burnt vehicles, reinforcing attribution.
Language and demeanour consistent with pride in the event.
Assessment:
Provides another perpetrator‑side confirmation, visually tying RSF to specific burned‑car kill sites confirmed by satellite.
When combined with earlier exhibits, supports a high‑confidence assessment of RSF responsibility for large portions of El Fasher’s missing.
Confidence: high.
Original X and Telegram Posts:
https://x.com/i/status/1999641053931176245
Exhibit 8 – RSF burning a farm‑goods truck to Al‑Dabbah and threatening road control
CONTENT: Censored video – RSF burning a farm‑goods truck on the way to Al‑Dabbah, with explicit threats.
Censored footage of RSF militants burning a farm‑goods truck heading to Al‑Dabbah, threatening to torch all traffic, seize roads and bridge to consolidate power; raises fears of more roadside killings.
Key indicators:
Agricultural/commercial vehicle, not military, is targeted.
Explicit threat to burn all traffic and control roads/bridge, indicating area denial and coercive control of movement.
Al‑Dabbah referenced, indicating an extension of lethal road tactics beyond El Fasher itself.
Assessment:
Demonstrates replication of road‑targeting tactics beyond a single siege environment, suggesting a broader RSF doctrine of using road terror to control territory and economies.
Implies high risk of future mass‑casualty events on routes like the Al‑Dabbah axis, relevant for humanitarian and UN route planning.
Confidence: high on intent; medium on projected casualty scale.
Original X and Telegram Posts:
https://x.com/i/status/2000038333477749064
Exhibit 9 – RSF celebrating burning of Sudanese villages along important trade routes
Censored video – RSF celebrating burned villages on important trade routes (early December 2025, after El Fasher siege).
RSF fighters celebrating burning of Sudanese villages along important trade routes in early December, after the siege; explicit mention that Sudan is under‑reported, justifying continued coverage.
Key indicators:
Visual evidence of extensive village burning and depopulation along trade routes.
Fighters frame destruction positively; routes described as “important”, confirming strategic view of these corridors.
Assessment:
Confirms continuing clearance operations after the fall of El Fasher, with a focus on strategic trade routes rather than only tactical front lines.
Shrinks plausible local destinations for survivors from El Fasher, reinforcing the conclusion that many “missing” civilians were killed or forced into extremely high‑mortality displacement conditions.
Confidence: high.
Original X and Telegram Posts:
https://x.com/i/status/2000415802982629564
Exhibit 10 – RSF drone strike on UNISFA camp in South Kordofan
CONTENT: Video – drone strike on UNISFA camp in Kadugli, South Kordofan.
Multiple UN peacekeepers killed in a drone strike on the UNISFA mission camp in Kadugli, South Kordofan; attributed to RSF; three drones hit a fuel station; Bangladeshi army confirms UN deaths.
Key indicators:
Target is a UN mission (UNISFA) camp, not a domestic armed actor.
Multiple drones used; fuel station inside camp is struck, indicating deliberate targeting of critical infrastructure within an international peacekeeping base.
Confirmation from Bangladeshi army of UN fatalities provides state‑level corroboration.
Assessment:
Demonstrates RSF’s capability and willingness to strike UN peacekeepers with drones, extending risk from road corridors to peacekeeping and humanitarian installations.
Degrades humanitarian and monitoring capacity across theatre, including Darfur, which indirectly worsens survivability for displaced populations and hampers documentation of atrocities like El Fasher.
Confidence: high.
Original X and Telegram Posts:
https://x.com/i/status/2001443013088751915
Integrated intelligence assessment
The combination of my exhibits with independent population and satellite data supports a high‑confidence assessment that:
RSF forces engaged in systematic hunting and execution of civilians inside and around El Fasher after the siege.
Fleeing civilians were repeatedly targeted along multiple escape axes, with convoy kill sites visible from satellite and confirmed by perpetrator‑side celebration footage.
Surrounding villages and trade corridors were deliberately burned and cleared, reducing local resettlement options and consolidating RSF control over economic and strategic routes.
RSF is willing to target UN peacekeeping infrastructure with drones, indicating that even international missions are within the threat envelope.
Overall judgment for dissemination:
It is highly likely that deaths among El Fasher’s civilian population are in the tens of thousands, and that a substantial portion of the roughly 150,000 “missing” civilians were killed in the city, at the siege perimeter, or on escape and trade routes subsequently cleared and controlled by RSF.
The observed RSF patterns—roadside mass executions, deliberate village clearance on trade routes, and drone strikes on UN assets—should be treated as part of an integrated operational behaviour set, not isolated incidents, when assessing future atrocity risk and planning humanitarian or peacekeeping deployments.
Confidence: high on pattern and direction; medium on exact casualty numbers pending further access and exhumation.
